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 A B S T R A C T  
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is one of the motivations of the occurrence of earnings 
management practices. Earnings management is done by a company to obtain a positive 
response from the market in order to increase the amount of funds. Good corporate go-
vernance (GCG) is considered capable of minimizing the measures of earnings manage-
ment because it has a goal to achieve a better and healthier company under the principles 
owned. This study aims to determine the effect of GCG on earnings management in 
companies that perform IPO. Samples are taken using purposive sampling method and 
are acquired as many as 31 companies, which are analyzed using multiple linear regres-
sions. The result of this study indicates that management ownership, independent com-
missioners, and audit committee have negative and significant relationship with earn-
ings management, in which this result is consistent with the research hypothesis. 
Meanwhile, institutional ownership has positive and significant relationship with earn-
ings management, in which this result is not consistent with the research hypothesis. 
 
  A B S T R A K  
Initial Public Offering (IPO) adalah salah satu motivasi terjadinya praktik manajemen 
laba. Manajemen laba dilakukan oleh perusahaan untuk memperoleh respon positif dari 
pasar dalam rangka meningkatkan jumlah dana. Good corporate governance (GCG) 
dianggap mampu meminimalkan tindakan manajemen laba karena ini bertujuan untuk 
mencapai perusahaan yang lebih baik dan sehat di bawah prinsip-prinsip yang dimiliki. 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh GCG terhadap manajemen laba 
pada perusahaan yang melakukan IPO. Sampel diambil dengan metode purposive sam-
pling dan diperoleh sebanyak 31 perusahaan, yang dianalisis dengan menggunakan 
regresi linier berganda. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan manaje-
men, komisaris independen, dan komite audit memiliki hubungan negatif dan signifikan 
dengan manajemen laba, dan temuan tersebut konsisten dengan hipotesis penelitian. 
Sementara itu, institutional ownership memiliki hubungan yang positif dan signifikan 
dengan manajemen laba, di mana hasil ini tidak konsisten dengan hipotesis penelitian. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) is a mechanism that 
should be conducted by a company when making 
stocks offering to public for the first time in primary 
market. The company’s goal to conduct the IPO is to 
meet the needs of additional funds for business ex-
pansion or for its operational funding. The company 
conducting IPO still has not had established market 
price, so accounting information becomes useful 
signal to investors (Yasa 2007). When the company 
reports higher earnings, the investors are expected to 
give a positive response. Most of the previous litera-
tures show that one of the main incentives for man-
agers to inflate accruals in the company’s IPO is to 
increase the IPO issuance price (Armstrong et al. 
2009). If the managers systematically inflate reve-
nues for increasing the stock price that may be ex-
pected with high discretionary accruals, the compa-
ny will have a high stock price. 
In order to be able to sell and make the compa-
ny’s shares demanded by the market, the manage-
ment presents the company’s financial information 
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with maximum earnings (Luhgiatno 2008). Many 
companies use the earnings information in their fi-
nancial statements as a benchmark to evaluate the 
performance of the companies. The company's earn-
ings information is so important that the manager 
always displays good earnings information by doing 
earnings management. Earnings management is 
defined as an opportunistic act in the sense that a 
manager has the opportunity to choose one of the 
accounting policies or actions that affect the earnings 
in order to achieve certain goals in reporting the 
earnings (Scott 2009: 403). One of the motives that 
lead the manager to conduct earning management is 
Initial Public Offering (Scott 2009: 411). A new go 
public company still does not have definite market 
value. It makes the company's managers tend to 
perform earnings management in their prospectus. 
For investors, it is more difficult to obtain informa-
tion of non-go public companies than that of go pub-
lic ones (Indra 2012). The information mastery gap 
between companies and potential investors is com-
monly called information asymmetry. Information 
asymmetry encourages the companies to perform 
earning management in order to get a positive mar-
ket reaction that will increase the amount of funds 
raised. Earnings management is done to make as if 
the income had good and stable earnings quality 
(Kusindratno and Sumarta 2005). 
The emergence of earnings management can be 
explained by agency theory (Ujiyantho and Pramuka 
2007). A manager, in practice, acts as an agent who is 
morally responsible for optimizing the benefit of the 
owner (principal), and in return the manager (agent) 
will be compensated according to the contract. Un-
der these conditions, there are two different interests 
in the company, where each party is trying to ac-
quire or maintain a desired level of prosperity. As a 
manager (agent) of the company, he knows the in-
ternal information and the company's prospects in 
the future better than the owner (principal). So, the 
manager has an obligation to provide a signal about 
the state of the company to the owner through the 
disclosure of accounting information. 
The detection of the possibility of earnings 
management in the financial statements can be in-
vestigated through the use of estimates of total ac-
cruals. Total accruals consist of nondiscretionary 
accrual (normal accrual) and discretionary accrual 
(abnormal accruals). The accrual used to perform 
earnings management is discretionary accrual (ab-
normal accruals). Earnings management using ac-
crual discretionary responds drastically to the incen-
tive of management (Cornett et al. 2008). 
Earnings management is a phenomenon that is 
difficult to avoid, but the practice can still be mini-
mized. Earnings management will be lower when 
there is a better monitoring on the management pol-
icy from institutional shareholders, board of direc-
tors and independent directors (Guna and Herawaty 
2010). The behavior of a manager who performs 
earning management can be minimized by applying 
the mechanism of Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG). The GCG proxied by independent directors 
has a significant influence on earnings management, 
where it is shown by the increasing control by inde-
pendent directors that will reduce the likelihood of 
earnings management action by the company (Afifa 
2013; Prabaningrat 2015). Management ownership 
has a significant influence on earnings management 
(Mahariana 2014). GCG proxied by institutional 
ownership has an influence on earnings manage-
ment, where it is shown from the number of shares 
held by institutional parties that will affect the deci-
sion of the management to manage earnings (Wa-
hyono et al. 2013). GCG proxied by audit committee 
has an effect of minimizing earnings management in 
a company (Wiralestari et al. 2012). 
One of the ways used to monitor the contract is-
sue and to limit the opportunistic behavior of the 
management is corporate governance (Xie et al. 2003; 
Cornett et al. 2006; Sriwedari 2012). The mechanism 
of corporate governance is a tool to reduce mana-
gerial opportunism (Tangjitprom 2013). The compa-
nies with poor corporate governance are more sus-
ceptible to managerial opportunism, and earnings 
management would be harmful to the company's 
value. Meanwhile, the companies with good corpo-
rate governance can reduce managerial opportunism 
and will be profitable for the company's value. Good 
corporate governance is shown by the presence of 
management ownership, institutional ownership, 
independent directors, and independent audit com-
mittee in the company. 
Managerial ownership is the shares held by the 
management personally and the shares held by a 
subsidiary of the company concerned and its affili-
ates (Sudibyo 2013). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
stated that large shares ownership, in terms of eco-
nomic value, has incentives to monitor (Sudibyo 
2013). Institutional ownership is the share ownership 
by the government, financial institutions, legal enti-
ties institution, foreign institutions, trust funds and 
other institutions (Alves 2012). Institutional owner-
ship has significant importance in monitoring the 
management because the existence of institutional 
ownership will encourage a more optimal supervi-
sion. Independent commissioner is one of the core of 
good corporate governance who is in charge of and 
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responsible for ensuring the implementation of cor-
porate strategy, overseeing the management in man-
aging the company, giving advice to the directors, 
and requiring the implementation of accountability. 
Independent commissioner usually consists of inde-
pendent board of commissioners who come from 
outside the company (NCCG 2001). The existence of 
audit committee is accepted as a part of Corporate 
Governance. Even in assessing the implementation 
of good corporate governance in the company, the 
presence of an effective audit committee is one of the 
aspects of assessment criteria (Purwandari 2011). 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESIS 
Agency theory argues that entity is the lifeblood of 
agency relationship and tries to understand organi-
zational behavior by examining how the parties in 
the agency relationship maximize the utility through 
cooperation. One of the most important agency rela-
tionships is the cooperation between the manage-
ment group and the entity owners. The manager is 
paid by the owner to manage the entity he leads, and 
cooperation indicates the creation of agency relation-
ship (Astika 2011: 76). Manager, in practice, acts as 
an agent and is morally responsible for optimizing 
the benefit of the owner (principal) and, in return, 
the manager (agent) will be compensated according 
to the contract. Under these conditions, there are two 
different interests in the company, in which each 
party is trying to acquire or maintain a desired level 
of prosperity. 
Earnings management is the action of a manag-
er to select accounting policies or the action that af-
fects earnings in order to achieve certain goals in 
reporting earnings (Scott 2009: 403). Subramanyam 
and Wild (2010: 130) stated that earnings manage-
ment occurs for several reasons, such as to avoid 
debt requirements, to meet analyst forecasts and to 
affect stock prices (Rizky 2011). Earnings manage-
ment can be done in two ways: (1) changing the ac-
counting method, which is the most obvious form of 
earnings management, and (2) changing the estima-
tion and accounting policies that determine the ac-
counting numbers, which is a more vague form of 
earnings management. Some of the motivation that 
lead the manager to perform earning management 
are Bonus Scheme, Debt Covenant, Political Motiva-
tion, Taxation Motivation, CEO turnover, and the 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) (Scott 2009: 411). 
Good Corporate Governance is one of the strat-
egies to limit the activities of earnings management 
by empowering the corporation both state and pri-
vate owned companies (Purwandari 2011). Accord-
ing to the National Committee on Corporate Gover-
nance Policy (KNKCG), corporate governance is a 
process and structure used by the organs of the 
company to provide added value to the company 
continuously in a long period for shareholders, with 
regard to the interests of other stakeholders, under 
the laws and norms applied. Corporate governance 
includes the relationship between the stakeholders 
involved and the objectives of company manage-
ment. The main parties in corporate governance are 
the shareholders, management and board of direc-
tors. Other stakeholders include employees, suppli-
ers, customers, banks and other creditors, regulators, 
environment, and the community. In this study, the 
mechanism of corporate governance is proxied by 
the mechanism of institutional ownership, indepen-
dent commissioner, managerial ownership and audit 
committee. 
According to Herawaty (2008), managerial 
ownership is the shares held by the management 
personally and the shares held by a subsidiary of the 
company concerned and its affiliates (Sudibyo 2013). 
In general, it can be said that a certain percentage of 
share ownership by management (managerial own-
ership) tends to affect earnings management action 
(Boediono 2005). 
Institutional ownership is the ownership by 
government, financial institutions, legal entity insti-
tutions, foreign institutions, trust funds and other 
institutions (Alves 2012). Institutional ownership has 
significant importance in monitoring the manage-
ment because the existence of institutional owner-
ship will encourage a more optimal supervision. The 
monitoring, of course, will ensure the prosperity of 
the shareholders, in which the effect of institutional 
ownership as a supervisory agent is pressed through 
their sizeable investments in the capital market (Ira-
wan 2013). 
The board of commissioners is the party in 
charge of supervising over the policies on the struc-
ture and general structure, both related to the com-
pany and the company's business, and giving advice 
to the board of directors (Afifa 2013). The presence of 
independent commissioners in a company can bal-
ance the decision-making, especially in the context of 
the protection of minority shareholders and other 
parties concerned. This indicates that the presence of 
independent commissioners in a company can influ-
ence the integrity of a financial report generated by 
the management. 
In the National Committee on Corporate Go-
vernance (NCCG 2011), the commissioners establish 
an audit committee consisting of the members of the 
board of commissioners. The audit committee con-
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sists of independent directors and external auditors 
and should present any reports to the board of 
commissioners. The existence of audit committee at 
this time is accepted as a part of a Corporate Gover-
nance. Even in assessing the implementation of good 
corporate governance in the company, the presence 
of an effective audit committee is one aspect of the 
assessment criteria (Purwandari 2011). 
Based on the above explanation, the problem 
that can be put forward in this study is whether 
good corporate governance has an effect on earnings 
management in companies that perform initial pub-
lic offering (IPO). The purpose of this study is to find 
out whether good corporate governance represented 
by management ownership, institutional ownership, 
independent commissioners and independent audit 
committee has an effect on earnings management in 
companies that perform IPO. The hypotheses that 
can be put forward are as follows: 
H1: Management ownership has negative effect on 
earnings management in companies that perform 
initial public offering (IPO) 
H2: Institutional ownership has negative effect on 
earnings management in companies that perform 
initial public offering (IPO) 
H3: Independent commissioner has negative effect 
on earnings management in companies that perform 
initial public offering (IPO) 
H4: Independent audit committee has negative effect 
on earnings management in companies that perform 
initial public offering (IPO). 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This research is a quantitative research. The object of 
this research is companies performing an initial pub-
lic offering (IPO) and listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) in 2008-2012. Sources of data in this 
study are derived from the company's annual finan-
cial statements from 2004 to 2012 and 
www.sahamok.com to collect companies performing 
IPO in 2008-2012. The data used in this research are 
secondary data obtained through the publication of 
the annual financial statements of the entire compa-
nies performing initial public offering (IPO) listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2008 to 
2012. 
The population of this research is the companies 
performing initial public offering (IPO) listed on the 
Stock Exchange from 2008 - 2012. The sampling 
technique used in this study is purposive sampling 
method and is acquired 31 companies. Data analysis 
technique used in this research is multiple linear 
regression analysis. The hypothesis in this study is 
tested using the feasibility test of the model (F-test) 
and individual parameter test (t-test) to determine 
the influence between variables. The classic assump-
tion test used in this study is the normality test, hete-
rocedasticity, multicolinearity test and autocorrela-
tion test. 
 
Classification of Variables 
The dependent variable is earnings management 
(DAC). The discretionary accruals (DAC) which 
becomes a proxy of earnings management is meas-
ured using a model developed by Kothari et al. 
(2005). The model of Kothari et al. (2005) is consi-
dered as the most appropriate model in measuring 
discretionary accruals because it has a better expla-
natory power. The stages of the determination of 
discretionary accruals are as follows: 
1. Calculating total accruals. 
TAit = NIit - CFOit  (1) 
Description: 
TAit = Total accruals of compnay i in year t 
NIit = Net income of cash from the operating activiti-
ers of company i in the period of t. 
CFOit = Cash flow from operating activities of com-
pany i in period of t. 
2. Determining the regression coefficient of total 
accruals. 
TAti/Ait-1 = α + β1(1/Ait-1) + β2((ΔREVit-ΔRECit)/Ait-1) + 
β3(PPEit/Ait-1) + β4(ROAit-1/Ait-1) + e (2) 
Description: 
TAit = Total accrual of company i in the year t (result-
ing from the calculation of the number 1 above) 
Ait-1 = Total assets of company i at the end of the year 
t-1 
ΔREVit = Changes in the earnings of company Peru-
bahan i in the year t 
ΔRECit = Changes in net receivable of company i in 
the year t 
PPEit = Property, plant and equipment of company i in 
the year t 
ROAit-1 = Return on assets of company i at the end of 
the year t-1. 
3. Determining Non-discretionary Accrual. 
NDACCit = α + β1(1/Ait-1) + β2((ΔREVit-ΔRECit)/Ait-1) + 
β3(PPEit/Ait-1) +  β4(ROAit-1/Ait-1) + e (3) 
Description: 
NDACCit = Non-discretionary accrual of company i in 
year t 
E = Error. 
4. Determining Discretionary Accrual 
DACCit = (TAit/Ait-1)–NDACCit (4) 
Description: 
DACCit = Discretionary accrualof company i in year t 
The independent variables in this study are: 
1. Managerial ownership (KpMj) 
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KpMj = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 × 100%  (5) 
2. Institutional ownership (KpInst) 
KpInst = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
 × 100%  (6) 
3. Independent Commissioner (KI) 
KI = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑜𝑓  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠
 × 100% (7) 
4. Independent audit committee (KMA) 
KMA = 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  
 × 100%  (8) 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 describes the minimum value, maximum 
value, mean value, and standard deviation of man-
agement ownership, institutional ownership, inde-
pendent commissioner, and independent audit 
committee. 
From Table 1, it can be seen that the minimum 
value of DAC is -0.218225 and the maximum value is 
4.910879. The mean value of 0.238242 indicates that 
the mean value of earnings management is in fairly 
low figure. This means that the mean value of earn-
ings management in the sample companies is rela-
tively low. Standard deviation of 0.880453 shows 
that the data variation of earnings management in 
the study samples is high. 
The minimum value of managerial ownership is 
0.000006, the maximum value is 0.736871, and the 
mean value is 0.092660. Share ownership by man-
agement as indicated by the relatively low mean 
value means that in the company samples, the aver-
age of the shares owned by the management is rela-
tively low. The standard deviation of 0.168767 is 
greater than the mean value, which means that the 
data variation of managerial ownership in the study 
sample is relatively high. 
The minimum value of institutional ownership 
is 0.100025, the maximum value of institutional 
ownership is 0.989209, and the mean value is 
0.667407. The high mean value of institutional own-
ership shows that the average share owned by insti-
tutional parties in the sample companies is quite 
high. The standard deviation of 0.234644 is greater 
than the mean value, which means that data varia-
tion of institutional ownership in the study sample is 
relatively high. 
The results of descriptive statistical analysis 
show that the minimum value of independent com-
missioners is 0.250000, the maximum value is 
0.500000, and the mean value is 0.342553. Judging 
from the low value of the independent commission-
ers, it can be said that the average number of inde-
pendent commissioners in the company sample is 
proportional with the number of commissioners 
from outside companies that are required by Na-
tional Committee on Governance Policies (KNKG). 
The standard deviation of 0.045460 is smaller than 
the average, which means that the data variation of 
independent commissioners in the study sample is 
quite low. 
The minimum value of the audit committee 
shown in Table 1 is 0.250000, the maximum value of 
the audit committee is 0.666667, and the mean value 
is 0.645698. The mean value of the audit committee 
in the company sample is relatively high. This shows 
the tendency that the number of audit committee 
from outside the company is relatively big. The 
standard deviation of 0.080042 is smaller than the 
Table 1 
Description of Data 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation 
DAC 31 -0.218225 4.910879 0.238242 0.880453 
KpMj 31 0.000006 0.736871 0.092660 0.168767 
KpInst 31 0.100025 0.989029 0.667407 0.234644 
KI 31 0.250000 0.500000 0.342253 0.045460 
KMA 31 0.250000 0.666667 0.645698 0.080042 
Valid N (listwise)      
Source: Processed data, 2014. 
 
Table 2 
Results of Classical Assumption Test 
Normality Variable 
Multicollinearity 
Heteroscedasticity 
Auto-
correlation Tolerance  VIF 
0.260 KpMj 0.490 2.039 0.158 2,160 
 KpInst 0.491 2.035 0.124  
 KI 0.911 1.098 0.239  
 KMA 0.949 1.054 0.116  
Sourcer: Processed data, 2014. 
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mean value, which means that the data variation of 
audit committee in the study sample is very low. 
 
Results of Classical Assumption Test 
Table 2 shows that the testing model has been free 
from the problem of normality, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis is used to deter-
mine the influence of managerial ownership, institu-
tional ownership, independent commissioners, and 
independent audit committees on earnings man-
agement in companies performing initial public of-
fering (IPO). The results of multiple linear regression 
analysis are shown in Table 3. 
The regression equation used in this study is: 
DAC = 7.949 - 1.127KpMj + 0.852KpInst - 10.864KI - 
4.000KMA 
Description: 
DAC = earnings management, 
KpMj = managerial ownership, 
KpInst = institutional ownership, 
KI = independent commissioners, 
KMA = independent audit committee. 
The result of F count is 53.038 with a probability 
level of 0.000a (significant). Probability of F = 0.000 
<0.05, so it can be concluded that this model fits to 
be used in the research. Table 3 also shows that the 
independent variables consisting of managerial 
ownership (KpMj), institutional ownership (KpInst), 
independent commissioner (KI), and independent 
audit committee (KMA) have significant influence 
on the dependent variable consisting of earnings 
management (DAC). 
Based on Table 3, it can be seen that the regres-
sion coefficient and significance value of managerial 
ownership variable are negative. These results mean 
that the hypothesis, which states that the manage-
ment ownership has a significant negative effect on 
earnings management in companies performing 
IPO, is received. The results of this study show that 
the less percentage of share ownership by manage-
ment is likely to lead to earnings management in a 
company. This is indicated by the results of statistic-
al analysis where the relatively low average owner-
ship of shares by the management makes the man-
agement not flexible in taking decisions to present 
report as desired, thus allowing the intervention of 
larger shareholders that causes the management to 
perform earning management. 
Based on Table 3, it can be seen that the regres-
sion coefficients and significance value of institu-
tional ownership variable are positive. These results 
mean that the hypothesis, which states that the insti-
tutional ownership has a significant negative effect 
on earnings management in companies performing 
IPO, is rejected. Institutional ownership in this study 
has a significant positive effect on earnings man-
agement in companies performing IPO, which 
means that the increasing institutional ownership 
will increase earnings management action. The re-
sults of this study are in accordance with the views 
expressed by Potter (1992) in Jao and Pagalung 
(2011), that an institutional investor is the temporary 
owner that focuses on current earnings or short-term 
earnings. 
Based on Table 3, it can be seen that the regres-
sion coefficient and significance value of indepen-
dent commissioners variable are negative. These 
results mean that the hypothesis, which states that 
independent commissioner has a significant negative 
effect on earnings management in companies per-
forming IPO, is received. The results are consistent 
with the results of Rahmawaty (2013), and Cornett 
(2009) that independent commissioner has negative 
effect on earnings management. The lower the level 
of supervision of independent directors, the higher 
the tendency of managers to manipulate earnings in 
the financial statements. It shows that as one of the 
indicators of good corporate governance, indepen-
dent commissioner has contributed effectively in the 
process of preparing qualified financial reporting to 
limit earnings management in the company. 
Table 3 
Results of Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Variable Regression Coefficient t Sig 
Konstant  7.949  11.032 0.000 
KpMj -1.127 -2.344 0.028 
 KpInst  0.852 2.458 0.021 
KI -10.864 -14.548 0.000 
KMA -4.000 -3.105 0.005 
Adj R2 = 0.874 F = 53.038 
df = n-k = 31-5= 26 Sig. = 0.000 
Source: Processed data, 2014. 
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Based on Table 3, it can be seen that the regres-
sion coefficients and significance value of indepen-
dent audit committee variable are negative. These 
results mean that the hypothesis, which states that 
independent audit committee has a significant nega-
tive effect on earnings management in companies 
performing IPO, is received. The results of this study 
are consistent with the results of the researches by 
Chtourou et al. (2001), Xie et al. (2003), and Wirales-
tari (2012), that the presence of audit committee from 
outside is able to protect shareholders from oppor-
tunistic action, such as earnings management done 
by manager. As one of the variables of good corpo-
rate governance, the existence of independent audit 
committee proves to help companies limit or reduce 
earnings management action. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
Based on the results of discussion, the conclusions 
that can be put forward are: (1) management owner-
ship has significant negative effect on earnings man-
agement in companies performing IPOs. It is in line 
with the hypothesis that the lack of stock ownership 
by management makes the management not flexible 
in making decisions as desired, causing manage-
ment tend to perform earnings management; (2) 
institutional ownership has a significant positive 
effect on earnings management in companies per-
forming IPO. It is in line with the views of Potter 
(1992) in Jao and Pagalung (2011) that institutional 
investors are temporary owners who focus on short-
term earnings; (3) independent commissioner has a 
significant negative effect on earnings management 
in companies performing IPO. It is in line with the 
results of the researches conducted by Cornett 
(2009), and Rahmawaty (2013) that the greater the 
number of independent commissioners, the higher 
the level of supervision made so as to be able to mi-
nimize the actions of earnings management; (4) in-
dependent audit committee has significant negative 
effect on earnings management in companies per-
forming IPO. It is in line with the results of the re-
searches conducted by Xie et al. (2003) and Wirales-
tari (2012) that the fewer the audit committees from 
outside of the company, the lower the supervision 
on the management which is considered less able to 
minimize earnings management practices. 
Further researchers are recommended to be able 
to add or extend the period in measuring discretio-
nary accruals in order to get a more accurate value 
and can use other measurement methods of discre-
tionary accruals in detecting earnings management 
in a company. 
This study is limited to only using accrual-based 
earnings management, but in fact the company uses 
various earnings management techniques. There-
fore, Roychowdury (2006) stated that the accounting 
researches that draw conclusions about the earnings 
management only by basing on the accrual adjust-
ment alone might be less valid (Ratmono 2010). So it 
is necessary to understand the earnings management 
conducted by companies through real activities oth-
er than through the accrual activities. 
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